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The Constitutional Law of Defamation:
Are All Speakers Protected Equally?
INTRODUCTION
Defamation law traditionally protected individuals against "invasion [of
their] interest in reputation and good name."' Juxtaposed, however, are the
freedoms of speech and press that ensure "uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open" debate on public issues.2 Nevertheless, prior to 1964 the law of libel and
slander was governed by state law, entirely outside the purview of the United
States Constitution.3 That year the United States Supreme Court decided
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,4 holding that defamatory speech was not
exempt from first amendment scrutiny. 5 From that premise the Court went on
to hold that the first amendment 6 mandates limitations on state defamation
law.7
New York Times and its progeny were attempts to balance the interests
protected by defamation law and those protected by the first amendment. 8
Although the Supreme Court has never held defamatory speech worthy of
constitutional protection for its own sake, it has noted that in some circum-
stances defamatory falsehoods must be protected "in order to protect speech
I. W. PROSSER. HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § I II, at 737 (4th ed. 1971). See also Eaton, The
American Law of Dejamation through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Priner, 61 VA.
L. REV. 1349, 1357-59 (1975).
2. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. 270 (1964).
3. In New York Ties Co. v. Sullivan the Supreme Court acknowledged its prior statement that "the
Constitution does not protect libelous publications," 376 U.S. 254. 268 (1964) (citing Konigsberg v. State Bar of
Cal., 366 U.S. 36. 49 n.10 (1961); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 48 (1961); Roth v. United
States. 354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois. 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328
U.S. 331, 348-49 (1946); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); and Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697, 715 (1931)).
4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5. Id. at 269 ("[L]ibel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations.").
6. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of relig-
ion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
Although the first amendment acts only as a restriction on Congress, the Supreme Court has held that all
provisions of the first amendment have been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and are therefore
binding on the states. Thus, for simplicity, this Comment will speak of the limitations imposed on the states by
the first amendment, through the fourteenth, as first amendment limitations. For the cases "incorporating" the
first amendment, see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947) (establishment clause); Cantwell v. Connec-
ticut. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise clause); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (free speech clause);
Near v. Minnesota. 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (free press clause); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (assembly
and petition clauses).
7. 376 U.S. 254. 279-80 (1964). See also infra notes 47-166 and accompanying text.
8. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.. 418 U.S. 323, 341-42 (1974), and the cases cited therein. See also infra
notes 47-83 and accompanying text.
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that matters." 9 This Comment will attempt to determine which speech
"matters" for purposes of the constitutional defamation privileges.
The constitutional defamation privileges clearly emanate from the first
amendment. The clause or combination of clauses that give rise to the priv-
ileges, however, is unclear. The first amendment protects four separate, albeit
overlapping, verbal freedoms: the freedoms of religion, speech, and press,
and the right to petition the government for redress of grievances. '0 Although
several Supreme Court decisions imply that the constitutional defamation
privileges protect only the press and broadcast media," the "chilling effect"
of potential defamation suits can also inhibit other first amendment activity.
This problem is exemplified by two lines of cases: one presents the split
of authority on whether New York Times and other constitutional defamation
privileges protect nonmedia speech,' 2 and the other culminates in the recog-
nition that the right to petition is entitled to a privilege beyond that afforded
by New York Times and its progeny. 3 Whether the constitutional defamation
privileges protect only the press and broadcast media or whether they extend
to all speakers remains an open question. 4
This Comment will first define the scope of protection provided by con-
stitutional defamation law, without considering whom is entitled to its protec-
tion, 15 and then will examine the split of authority on the issue of New York
Times' applicability to nonmedia speech and to the right to petition.' 6 This
Comment will also propose a unitary standard under which both media and
nonmedia speech are subject to the limitations of New York Times and its
progeny. ' 7 This Comment will conclude by demonstrating that heightened
protection for persons exercising the right to petition is unnecessary. '$ Adop-
tion of a unitary standard, consistent with precedent and constitutional
policy, will clarify one of the major ambiguities inherent in the constitutional
law of defamation and will further the policies underlying Neiv York Times
and the other constitutional defamation decisions.
9. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
10. See supra note 6. Freedom of assembly, although not a verbal freedom, is a part of freedom of
expression since it includes "'more than the right to attend a meeting: 'it includes the right to express one's
attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group .... "" NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 829 (1978) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965)). The establish-
ment of religion clause prohibits "'government sponsorship of religion." NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG.
HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 850 (1978). Neither the assembly nor establishment clauses,. however.
protect any specific verbal freedom.
I1. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 424 U.S. 448, 456 (1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.. 418 U.S. 323,
347-50 (1974).
12. Courts and commentators have taken at least four different positions on the question whether the
constitutional defamation privileges are applicable to nonmedia speech. See infra notes 172-75 and accompany-
ing text.
13. See Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981) (the right to petition gives rise to an absolute privilege).
14. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. II1, 133 n.16 (1979) (unnecessary to decide -'whether the Nei
York Thnes standard can apply to an individual defendant rather than a media defendant-); Babbitt v. United
Farm Workers. 442 U.S. 289. 309 n. 16 (1979) (Gertz'applicability to nonmedia defendants is an open question).
15. See ifra notes 47-166 and accompanying text.
16. See ifra notes 167-83 and accompanying text.
17. See ifra notes 184-225 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 226-339 and accompanying text.
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF DEFAMATION
A. The Evolution of the Constitutional Law of Defamation
To understand the constitutional law of defamation, one must be familiar
with the principles of common-law defamation. Gaining that understanding,
however, is not an easy task. As Dean Prosser succinctly noted, "IT]here is a
great deal of the law of defamation which makes no sense." 9
1. The Common-Law Background
At common law defamation consisted of the "twin torts of libel and
slander."-20 Generally, libel was a written defamation and slander was oral.
Despite basic similarities, for historical reasons the two torts developed dif-
ferent rules. 2' The brief description that follows, however, will outline only
the general rules of common-law defamation, without a pedantic discussion of
their nuances.
Defamation is defined as communication that tends "to harm the reputa-
tion of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter
third persons from associating or dealing with him." 22 Thus, the function of
defamation law is protection of a person's "interest in reputation and good
name." 3 That function is served in two ways: first, by granting an injured
plaintiff compensation for harm to his reputation; 24 and second, by giving an
injured plaintiff the opportunity to "vindicate his reputation ... in a public
forum."25
At common law a plaintiff had to establish two elements to state a prima
facie case: that the defendant published a statement and that the statement
was defamatory. 6 The type of defamation determined its actionability. Libel
19. W. PROSSER, supra note I. § I l, at 737.
20. Id. But see L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 13 (1978) (discussing the emergence of a
third type of defamation: "the defamacast"-an oral defamations communicated through the broadcast media).
21. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 112. at 751-52.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). Defamation has also been defined as "words which
tend to expose one to public hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostra-
cism, degradation or disgrace, or to induce an evil opinion of one in the minds of right-thinking persons, and to
deprive one of their confidence and friendly intercourse in society." Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal,
262 N.Y. 99. 100, 186 N.E. 217, 218 (1933).
23. W. PROSSER, supra note 1. § 11l, at 737.
24. Eaton, supra note 1, at 1358.
25. Id. at 1353. Since the constitutional privileges may negate a falsely defamed plaintiff's ability to
vindicate his reputation in a public forum, some commentators have examined the possibility that an injured
plaintiff be entitled to either nominal damages or a retraction for any defamatory falsehood. See, e.g., id. at
1431-32; Frakt, Defanation Since Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Emerging Common Law, 10 RUT.-CAM.
L.J. 519. 582 (1979). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 620 comment c (1977).
Although Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), might be viewed as limiting state
authority to enact retraction statutes, Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Tornillo stated that the decision
"addresses only 'right of reply' statutes and implies no view on the constitutionality of retraction statutes
affording plaintiffs able to prove defamatory falsehoods a statutory action to require publication of a retrac-
tion." Id. at 258 (Brennan, J., concurring).
26. W. PROSSER. supra note 1, § 113. Publication is the term of art used to designate the defamatory
comment's "'communicat[ion] to some one other than the person defamed.... [This does not mean that it
must be printed or written; ... [but if] there is no communication to any one but the plaintiff ... no tort action
can be maintained upon the theory of defamation." Id. at 766.
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was actionable per se: a libel's publication gave rise to a presumption of
general damages. 7 Slander was considered less serious than libel, and was
thus actionable per se only in specific instances. 28 If the defamation was not
actionable per se, the plaintiff had to prove "special damage ' 29 to obtain a
recovery.30 The distinction between types of defamation had the incongruous
result of allowing some plaintiffs who had suffered no injury to recover
damages, while precluding relief to others who incurred serious damage to
their reputation but were unable to prove special damage.3 In either case,
however, libel and slander were strict liability torts.
3 2
Defamation defendants had the benefit of two affirmative defenses: truth
and privilege. At common law the plaintiff's proof of a defendant's publica-
tion of a libel or slander gave rise to a presumption of the statement's falsity.
3
Therefore, the defendant had the burden of proving the statement's truth.
Proof of the statement's truth, however, constituted a complete defense in
civil defamation actions.34
The second defense was privilege. 5 Common-law privileges were of two
types: absolute and qualified. Absolute privilege gave certain communica-
tions made during judicial, legislative, or other governmental proceedings
absolute immunity from defamation liability.3 6 Qualified privileges gave
27. Id. § 112, at 762. There is an exception to the rule that libels are actionable per se. When a plaintiffmust
prove extrinsic facts to demonstrate a statement's defamatory character, some jurisdictions treat the libel as
only actionable "per quod. " As an example of a libel per quad, Prosser describes a newspaper that published a
report that the plaintiff had given birth to twins. The extrinsic fact was that she had been married only one
month. Id. at 763 n.30.
In 1971 Prosser claimed that the majority ofjurisdictions treated libel per quad as slander-only actionable
per se in specific instances, otherwise requiring proof of special damage. Id. at 763. But see L. ELDREDGE.
supra note 20, §§ 23-28 (arguing that the concept of libel per quod is being steadily abandoned).
28. Slanders are actionable per se in only four instances: 1) accusations of crime, 2) accusations that a
person suffers from a loathsome disease (usually venereal disease); 3) defamations affecting a plaintiffs busi-
ness, trade, or professional reputation; and 4) accusations of sexual unchastity or perversion. See W. PROSSER.
supra note 1. § 112, at 754-60; Annot., Inputation oJHomosexuality as Defamation, 3 A.L.R.4TH 752 (1931).
29. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 112, at 760-62. To prove special damage the plalntiff generally had to
show specific evidence of pecuniary loss.
30. See supra notes 27 & 28. See generally L. ELDREDGE, supra note 20. §§ 29-34; W. PROSSER. supra
note 1, § 112.
31. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 112.
32. To demonstrate the concept of strict liability, Prosser related the following true anecdote:
The defendants published in their newspaper a story ... to the effect that one Artemus Jones. a
person whom they intended and believed to be entirely fictitious, had been seen ... with a woman not
his wife .... [A] real Artemus Jones [then claimed] that the story had been understood by his
neighbors to refer to him [and was subsequently awarded damages]. [Tihe defendant's innocence did
not excuse him from liability.
Id. § 113, at 772. See generally id. § 113. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 580B comment b (1976)
(stating that the common law requires intent, or at least negligence, in the communication of a defamation to a
third party).
33. See W. PROSSER. supra note 1. § 116, at 798.
34. Id. Truth was not necessarily a defense in criminal libel prosecutions. Id. at 797-98.
35. Privilege is a defense that allows a defamatory utterance to -'escape liability because the defendant is
acting in futherance of some interest of social importance, which is entitled to protection even at the expense of
uncompensated harm to the plaintiffs reputation." Id. § 114, at 776.
36. Id. § 114. For a full discussion of situations in which an absolute privilege is applicable, see
L. ELDREDGE, supra note 20. §§ 72-77.
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speakers acting in furtherance of important specific interests3 7 conditional
protection that was lost if the privilege was abused or exceeded.38
Although a major purpose of defamation law was to compensate the
plaintiff for damage to his reputation, libels and slanders actionable per se
gave rise to a presumption of damages without proof of actual harm. 39 Even in
libels per quod4° and slanders not actionable per se, which required proof of
special damage, once the plaintiff established special damage he could also
recover general damages.4' In either case, if the plaintiff proved malice he
could be awarded punitive damages.42
Because of their classification as strict liability torts, libel and slander
placed the "written or spoken word in the same class with the use of explo-
sives or the keeping of dangerous animals."- 43 The threat of strict liability
coupled with defamation law's presumptions of falsity and damages neces-
sarily inhibited first amendment activity. 45 Against this common-law back-
ground, the Supreme Court decided New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.46
2. The Supreme Court Decisions
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, it squarely faced the issue whether defamatory speech should re-
main excluded from first amendment protection. 47 The case concerned a polit-
ical advertisement in the New York Times that allegedly defamed a city com-
missioner of Montgomery, Alabama.48 The Court, realizing that the first
amendment needs "breathing space, ' 49 held that defamatory speech is en-
titled to constitutional protection in some situations.50 Specifically, the Court
held that criticism of the official conduct of public officials is constitutionally
37. Prosser lists the important interests that give rise to a qualified privilege: 1) interest of the publisher; 2)
interest of others; 3) common interest of the publisher and his audience; 4) communications to one who may act
in the public interest: 5) fair comment on matters of public concern; and 6) reports of public proceedings. W.
PROSSER, supra note I, § 115. For a more complete discussion of the scope of the qualified privilege, see L.
ELDREDGE, supra note 20, §§ 83-94.
38. A qualified privilege could be abused in several ways: the speaker might step outside the scope of the
privilege (i.e., publication to a larger audience than necessary); the speaker might communicate the defamation
maliciously (in the sense of ill will). or the speaker might knowingly (or, in some jurisdictions, negligently)
publish a falsehood. See W. PROSSER. supra note I. § 113, at 792-96.
39. Id. § 112. See also supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 27.
41. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 761.
42. See Eaton, supra note 1, at 1358.
43. W. PROSSER, supra note 1. § 113. at 773.
44. See supra notes 27-30 & 33 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
46. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
47. Id. For a list of-the Court's prior decisions refusing to afford constitutional protection to defamatory
speech, see cases cited supra note 3.
48. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. 256 (1964).
49. Id. at 272.
50. Id. at 279-80.
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insulated from defamation liability absent clear and convincing proof 5' that
the defendant acted with "actual malice." 
52
The New York Times Court based its holding on the rationale that the fear
of a possible defamation suit would inhibit potential critics from voicing com-
plaints about public officials1 3 Although the Court acknowledged that truth is
generally a defense in civil defamation actions,54 it noted that "erroneous
statement is inevitable in free debate." ' 5  From that premise the Court found
that the fear of a potential defamation action stemming from an inadvertent
error or honest mistake of fact has a chilling effect on the exercise of first
amendment rights.5 6 To protect against this result, the Court recognized the
constitutional defamation privilege.5 7 Further, since public officials were al-
ready entitled to an absolute defamation privilege, 58 the Court held that
government critics were entitled to a similar privilege.5 9
Actual malice, distinct from the common-law concept of malice relating
to hatred, spite, or ill will, 60 is defined as knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard of the truth. 6' The actual malice standard ensures that a defamation
defendant will not be held liable simply because he has ill will for his target, or
because he makes an inadvertent error or honest misstatement of fact. 62
Under the New York Times standard a critic of a public official may speak
51. Id. at 285-86.
52. Id. at 279-80. Actual malice is defined as knowledge or reckless disregard of a statement's falsity. See
ifra notes 125-37 and accompanying text.
53. 376 U.S. 254, 278-79 (1964). The Court recognized that in the absence of a privilege government critics
will "steer far wider of the unlawful zone." which will lead to unnecessary "self-censorship" so that not "only
false speech will be deterred." Id.
54. Id. at 278.
55. Id. at 271.
56. Id. at 278-79.
57. Id. at 279-80. Defamation suits brought by public officials have an effect similar to unconstitutional
seditious libel laws. Id. at 273-78. Although the Sedition Act of 1798 was never "tested in [the Supreme]
Court," Justice Brennan's opinion was based on the premise that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional. Id. at
276. The New York Times Court noted, incidentally, that "no court of last resort in this country has ever held, or
even suggested, that prosecutions for libel on government have any place in the American system ofjurispru-
dence." Id. at 291 (quoting City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 307 II1. 595, 601, 139 N.E. 86. 88 (1923)).
58. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 574 (1959) (held that federal government officials are entitled to an
absolute defamation privilege in performing their official duties). Many state government officials are also
entitled to an absolute privilege. See L. ELDREDGE. supra note 20, §§ 73-75.
59. 376 U.S. 254, 283-84 (1964). Although the Court did not give government critics an absolute privilege,
the Court recognized a privilege that allows a defendant to be subjected to defamation liability only if he at least
entertained "'serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731
(1968). The Barr Court noted that an absolute privilege for government officials is necessary to preserve the
integrity of government and its "effective administration." 360 U.S. 564, 570 (1959). The fear of a potential
defamation law suit "would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible," officials.
Id. at 571 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle. 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)). Thus the absolute privilege is intended
"not for [officials'] private indulgence but for the public good." 360 U.S. 564. 575 (1959) (quoting Tenney v.
Brandhave, 341 U.S. 367. 397 (1951)).
60. See Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357 (1965); Garrison v. Louisiana. 379 U.S. 64. 70-76 (1964); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). The public debate protected by the first amendment
may "well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials." Garrison v. Lousiana. 379 U.S. 64. 75 (1964).
61. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. 279-80 (1964).
62. See cases cited supra note 60. See also itfra notes 125-37 and accompanying text.
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freely as long as he does not deliberately or recklessly publish falsehoods. 63
After New York Times the next step in the evolution of the constitutional
law of defamation was Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,64 which extended the
New York Times actual malice privilege to another class of potential defama-
tion plaintiffs-public figures. 65 Although the two Curtis Publishing plaintiffs,
Butts and Walker, achieved their status by different routes, the Court deemed
both public figures, 66 thus establishing that public figure status may be
achieved "by position alone" 67 or by "thrusting ... [oneself] into the
'vortex' of an important public controversy." ' 68
The Court also held that public figure plaintiffs, like public officials,
could recover in defamation actions only if they could prove that a defendant
acted with actual malice. 69 The Court based this decision on a dual rationale:
public figure plaintiffs "commanded sufficient continuing public interest and
had sufficient access to the means of counterargument to be able 'to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies."' 70
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 7' although short-lived, was the third
major development in constitutional defamation law. A plurality of the Court,
focusing on the public's need to be informed on public issues, extended the
New York Times privilege to all matters of "public or general interest." 72
Justice Brennan did not, however, factor the conflicting reputational interest
of private persons into his plurality opinion, noting that a matter of public
interest does not become less so "merely because a private individual is
involved." 73
In 1974 when the Court decided Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 74 a majority
of the Court concurred in Justice Powell's opinion that restricted application
63. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. 279-80 (1964). But see Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28
(W. Va. 1981). in which the argument is made that although a defamatory comment may eventually be found to
be privileged, the fear of having to defend a defamation lawsuit may nevertheless have a chilling effect on the
exercise of first amendment rights. Id. at 46 (Neely, J.. dissenting).
64. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The decision was based on tandem cases, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Bitits and
Associated Press v. Walker. Id.
65. Id. at 155. See also Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co.. 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966). cert.
denied, 388 U.S. 909 (1967). Although decided before Curtis Publishing Co.. the Pailing Court recognized a
public figure privilege.
66. Butts was an athletic director at a major college. 388 U.S. 130, 135 (1967). Walker gained prominence
through his participation in the racial desegregation movement in the South. Id. at 140.
67. Id. at 155.
68. Id. Justice Harlan's lead opinion in Curtis Publishing Co. indicated that the public figure privilege
would be lost upon "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of
investigation and reporting adhered to by responsible publishers." Id. The rule that emerged from Curtis
Publishing Co.. however, originated in Chief Justice Warren's concurrence, which provided that the New York
THines actual malice standard is the proper test. Id. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J.. concurring). See Gertz v. Robert
Welch. Inc.. 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974) (stating that the New York Tines rule is equally applicable to public
officials and public figures).
69. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts. 388 U.S. 130. 155 (1967).
70. Id. (quoting Whitney v. California. 274 U.S. 357. 377 (Brandeis. J., dissenting)).
71. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
72. Id. at 43.
73. Id.
74. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
1983]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 44:149
of the New York Times actual malice privilege to statements concerning
public officials or public figures. 75 Gertz, therefore, repudiated Rosenbloom's
extension of New York Times to all matters of public concern and stressed
that the relevant consideration when determining the applicability of the New
York Times privilege is the plaintiff's status-not the subject matter of the
defamatory utterance.76
In light of Gertz the New York Times actual malice privilege can now be
asserted only against public officials and public figures. 77 Gertz, however,
abolished strict liability in defamation actions brought against publishers or
broadcasters by nonpublic plaintiffs. Although the Court refused to set a
specific standard of care, it held that as long as the states do not impose
"liability without fault" they may fashion their own standard of care for the
discussion of private persons. 78
The Court's defamation decisions since Gertz have primarily been at-
tempts to define the term "public figure," not to further circumscribe the
scope of the privileges. 79 Thus, today the first amendment guarantees two
privileges: the New York Times actual malice privilege8" and the Gertz fault
privilege. 8' After an examination of these privileges,8 - this Comment will
address the issue of which defendants may assert the New York Times and
Gertz privileges.83
75. Id. at 345.
76. Id. at 345-48. One reason the Gertz Court rejected Rosenbloon was its recognition of the 'difficulty of
forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of 'general or
public interest' . . . [or are] 'relevant to self-government'" Id. at 346 (citing Rosenbloom v. Metromedia. Inc..
403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
77. The Court held that private figures. unlike public figures, are not only more vulnerable to injury, but are
also more deserving of recovery. 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). The private plaintiff's greater vulnerability stems
from his lack of "access to the channels of effective communication [by which] to counteract false statements."
Id. at 344. The reason private figures are more deserving of recovery than public officials is that most public
figures have assumed the risk of adverse publicity by entering politics, by thrusting themselves to the forefront
of a public controversy, or by attaining such status that adverse publicity is inevitable. Id. at 344-45.
78. Id. at 347-48.
79. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979), Hutchinson v. Proxmire. 443 U.S. I 1 (1979).
and Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), have all wrestled with definitions of the term "public figure."
After Gertz the Court's only other major defamation decision was Herbert v. Lando. 441 U.S. 153 (1979). which
examined whether a defamation plaintiff has a right to discover a media defendant's editorial process so he could
establish the existence of actual malice.
80. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also infra notes 85-137 and accompanying
text.
81. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See also infra notes 138-55 and accompanying text.
82. See itfra notes 85-155 and accompanying text.
83. While the constitutional law of civil defamation has undergone much growth itself, Nei' York Titnes and
its progeny have been applied in numerous other situations: criminal libel (Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64
(1964) ): labor defamation actions (Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin. 418 U.S. 264 (1974); Linn v. United
Plant Guard Workers of Am.. Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966)); and invasion of privacy actions (Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co.. 419 U.S. 245 (1974); Time, Inc. v.
Hill. 385 U.S. 374 (1967)). See also Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (a public school teacher
may not be dismissed for criticizing her board of education absent proof of actual malice).
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B. The New York Times Privilege. 4
1. Public Officials
Public officials are one of two classes of defamation plaintiffs who must
surmount the Neit' York Tines privilege. 85 The privilege attaches only to
criticism of a public official's official conduct 86 or to comment on his fitness
for office. 87 Thus, one must consider two questions to determine whether the
public official privilege is applicable in a particular case: first, whether the
allegedly defamed individual falls within the definition of "public official";
and second, whether the allegedly defamatory utterance concerns either his
official conduct or his fitness for office.
The Supreme Court has only vaguely defined the term "public official."
In Rosenblatt v. Baer88 the Court noted that not all government employees
are public officials. Rather, public officials are government employees who
hold "a position in government [that] has such apparent importance that the
public has an independent interest in the qualifications . . . of the person who
holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and perform-
ance of all government employees." 8 9 This statement, however, does not
provide a clear demarcation between public officials and mere public em-
ployees. While presidents, governors, and most elected officials 9° and can-
didates for elective office 9' are public officials, just "how far down into the
lower ranks of government employees the 'public official' designation would
extend" 92 is unsettled.
The question of who qualifies as a public official is a matter of federal
constitutional law, 93 thus state law standards or designations are not deter-
minative. Under the Supreme Court's Rosenblatt test, only those persons in
"the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to
84. It would be more appropriate to entitle the privilege the New York Times-Curds Publishing privilege
because Neir York Times itself applies only to public officials. See supra notes 47-63 and accompanying text. In
this Comment. however, the term "New York Times privilege" will refer to both public officials and public
figures.
85. See surpra notes 47-63.
86. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254. 279 (1964).
87. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 76-77 (1964).
88. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
89. Id. at 86.
90. See Annot.. 19 A.L.R.3D 1361 (1968). The annotation cites no case in which an elected official was not
held to be a public official. Klahr v. Winterble, 4 Ariz. App. 158. 418 P.2d 404 (1966). stretched the idea to its
limit, deeming a student elected to a state university senate a public official. See also Monitor Patriot Co. v.
Roy. 401 U.S. 265. 271 (1971) (implying that all holders of elective office are public officials).
91. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy. 401 U.S. 265, 271 (1971). held that critics of candidates for elective office
are also entitled to the protection of New York Times. The Court noted, however, that candidates might more
properly be termed public figures. but since any distinction is academic the Court did not resolve the issue. Id.
See also Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron. 401 U.S. 295. 300-01 (1971). For a cataloging of lower court
treatment of the term "public official." see Annot.. 19 A.L.R.3D 1361 (1968).
92. Rosenblatt v. Baer. 383 U.S. 75.85 (1966) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254. 283
n.23 (1964)).
93. Rosenblatt v. Baer. 383 U.S. 75. 84 (1966).
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have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of govern-
mental affairs" are public officials. 94 A noteworthy point, however, is that the
public interest in a government position cannot stem only from "the scrutiny
and discussion occasioned by the particular charges in controversy." 9,5 Since
the Supreme Court has said that "'public official[dom]' . . . cannot be thought
to include all public employees, ' 96 lower courts, by holding that school
teachers, police officers, and other mere public employees fall within the
category,97 may have taken an unnecessarily broad view of the term "public
official."
The New York Times privilege, however, does not create an open season
on public officials. To be privileged, a speaker's comments concerning a
public official must relate to either the public official's conduct 9 or to a
matter affecting his "fitness for office." 99 Although attacks on the public
official's private life are not privileged,'00 the constitutional shield is not re-
moved merely because "an official's private reputation, as well as his public
reputation, is harmed."' 0 ' Thus, an official's personal attributes are open to
privileged criticism only if those personal traits "might touch on an official's
fitness for office." 102 For example, allegations of "criminal conduct, no
matter how remote in time or place," are relevant to a public official's fitness
for office.'03 Once a public official leaves public office, however, his critics
retain the New York Times privilege only if he remains or becomes a public
figure.'14
2. Public Figures
While criticism of public officials is one aspect of public discussion
shielded by New York Times and its progeny from the inhibiting effect of
potential defamation actions, discussion of other matters of public concern is
equally deserving of first amendment protection. 105 New York Times, how-
94. Id. at 85.
95. Id. at 86 n. 13. Cf. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. I11. 135 (1979) (defamation defendants cannot
'create their own defense by making the claimant a public figure").
96. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. I1l. 119 n.8 (1979).
97. See Note, The Constitutional Law of Defamation--Recent Developments and Suggested State Court
Responses, 33 ME. L. REV. 371, 392-93 (1981).
98. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
99. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 76-77 (1964).
100. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 301-02 (1964).
101. Garrison v. Lousiana, 379 U.S. 64, 76-77 (1964).
102. Id.
103. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971). But cf. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n. 443
U.S. 157, 168 (1979) (rejecting the argument that "any person who engages in criminal conduct automatically
becomes a public figure").
104. The privilege may sometimes remain intact to protect criticism of a former official's conduct during the
time he was in office. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 87 n.14 (1966).
105. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29,40-43 (1971). Although Rosenbloom was expressly
rejected in Gertz, it seems clear that the first amendment interest in public controversies is the same whether
public or private persons are concerned. Gertz merely promulgated a rule that considered a private person's
greater entitlement to and enhanced need for the protection afforded by defamation law. Gertz v. Robert Welch.
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-48 (1974).
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ever, is limited to discussion of those who have assumed the risk of adverse
publicity and criticism. Whereas all public officials have voluntarily entered
into the public eye, not all persons involved in events of public concern have
assumed this risk. Generally, persons deemed "public figures" affirmatively
enter into the public eye, thus assuming the risk of adverse publicity. How-
ever, they also gain through their status or position the opportunity to exer-
cise the self-help remedy of using the mass media to effectively rebut defama-
tory falsehoods. Public figures are therefore both less vulnerable to injury and
less deserving of recovery.'"
As with public officials, the scope of privileged comment on public
figures is limited. The Supreme Court has recognized three types of public
figures: the all purpose public figure, the limited public figure, and the in-
voluntary public figure. 'o' The scope of privileged comment depends on the
type of public figure concerned.
All purpose public figures are individuals who "achieve such pervasive
fame or notoriety" 0S or "occupy positions of such persuasive power and
influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. "'09 The New
York Tihes privilege is apparently applicable to any comment or criticism of
an all purpose public figure's life or activities. "o But "[a]bsent clear evidence
of general fame ... and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, an
individual should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects of his
life.'' " 1
Limited purpose public figures are individuals who "thrust themselves to
the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the reso-
lution of the issues involved." 112 The first requisite for finding a limited pur-
pose public figure is his involvement in a bona fide public controversy, which
is not the equivalent of "controversies of interest to the public." "1 A person
must have voluntarily " 4 attempted to influence public opinion" 5 concerning
the public controversy to qualify as a limited public figure. 16 The press can-
106. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
107. Id. at 345.
108. Id. at 351.
109. Id. at 345. The Court has implicitly held that "all purpose" public figures must have national, not
merely local, fame or notoriety. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976).
110. See, e.g., Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976). See also Wolston v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167-68 (1979) ("[Miore than mere newsworthiness [is necessary] to justify applica-
tion of the demanding burden of New York Times."); J. BARRON & C. DIENES, HANDBOOK OF FREE
SPEECH AND FREE PRESS § 6:12 (1979).
I1l. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974) (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 345.
113. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976).
114. Examining the issue whether initiation of litigation is a voluntary action, the Court stated that "resort
to the judicial process ... is no more voluntary in a realistic sense than [use of the courts by a] defendant called
upon to defend his interest in court." Id. But see Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1234 (6th
Cir. 1981) (implying that bringing a spurious lawsuit or making an accusation of crime without probable cause
meets the voluntariness requirement).
115. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167-68 (1979).
116. Time, Inc. v. Firestone. 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976). The Firestone Court denied that the public contro-
versy requirement was a resurrection of Rosenbloom. because public controversy is not the equivalent of a
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not create a public figure merely by publicizing an account of that person's life
or activities. "17
Limited public figures are, therefore, public figures in only specific in-
stances. The New York Times privilege attaches only to discussion of the
public controversy in which they are involved;" s for all other purposes
limited public figures remain private persons. Whether public figures retain
their protected status for purposes of historical discussion after interest in the
public controversy has subsided, however, remains an unresolved question." 9
Although acknowledging that "instances of truly involuntary public
figures must be exceedingly rare," 20 the Gertz Court suggested that involun-
tary public figure status is possible despite the doctrine's inconsistency with
the Court's rationale for extending constitutional protection to discussion of
public figures. The Court's presumption that public figures voluntarily as-
sume the risk of adverse publicity by entering into the public limelight' 2 ' is
completely without merit when one involuntarily becomes a public figure.
The Supreme Court's recent defamation decisions have thus stressed the
voluntariness element and have virtually ignored the possibility that a person
may involuntarily become a public figure. 22 Thus, some commentators be-
lieve that the involuntary public figure classification has lost its viability. '23
Elimination of the involuntary public figure doctrine is a sound idea,
given the rationale underlying the public figure aspect of the New York Times
rule. Assumption of the risk of adverse publicity, however, is only half of the
New York Times' dual rationale, the other half being the availability of self-
help through access to the media. Thus, if a person is ever deemed an involun-
tary public figure, he will likely be one who receives substantial media atten-
tion despite any action on his part. 124 Attributing public figure status other-
matter of public or general interest. Id. "[A]pparently 'public controversy' is not to be so narrowly construed as
to limit the term to matters of political life and self-government," but rather should be used to distinguish
matters that are private, albeit stimulating public interest, and truly public controversies. J. BARRON & C.
DIENES, supra note 110, § 6:13, at 285.
117. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979). "Clearly those charged with defamation cannot, by
their own conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a public figure." Id.
118. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-55 (1976).
119. In Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979), the Court sidestepped the issue whether a
public figure remains a public figure for purposes of later discussion of or historical commentary on the original
public controversy. Justice Blackmun, however, intimated that the passage of time can cause the lapse of public
figure status. Id. at 170 (Blackmun, J., concurring). But see Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227
(6th Cir. 1981); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977). Both Street and Meeropol held that the mere
passage of time does not affect one's public figure status regarding the original public controversy.
120. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
121. See id. at 344-45.
122. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 165-68 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S.
111, 135 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,453-55 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.. 418 U.S. 323.
345 (1974). See also Note, The Evoltution of the Public Figure Doctrine in Defamation Actions, 41 OHIO ST. L.J.
1009, 1030-35 (1980).
123. See, e.g., J. BARRON & C. DIENES, supra note 110, § 6:14. The authors noted, however, that courts
may hold constitutionally sufficient a plaintiff's voluntary involvement in a matter -'which subsequently [be-
comes] a focus of public attention." Id. § 6:13, at 290.
124. Substantial authority holds that the families, friends, and associates of public figures may be deemed
public figures without any affirmative action seeking publicity, or that at least a reduced standard may apply.
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wise is a reversion to Rosenbloom-forcing a person to surmount New York
Times merely because of his newsworthiness.
3. The Actual Malice Limitation
To surmount the New York Times privilege a public plaintiff's must
prove with "convincing clarity" 2 6 that the defamation defendant acted with
actual malice. It is unfortunate that the New York Times Court chose the
term "actual malice" to name the constitutional threshold. Because of the
many common-law definitions attached to the term "malice," some lower
courts were initially confused by the use of this term. ,27 Under New York
Times, malice in the sense of spite, ill will, or desire to do injury, is not
constitutionally sufficient to maintain an action. 128 Although the presence of
common-law malice may affect a plaintiff's right to punitive damages, 2 9 it is
irrelevant to attachment of the constitutional privilege. 1
30
To reach the constitutional threshold, a public plaintiff must show that
the defendant at least "entertained serious doubts as to the truth" of the
allegedly defamatory comment. '31 Thus, a plaintiff against whom the privilege
is asserted must surmount the "rigorous requirements" 132 of proving a state-
ment's falsity133 and the defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard of that
falsity.
Although the protection New York Times and Curtis Publishing afford
defamation defendants is frequently termed a "privilege," that term is a mis-
nomer. 134 Since New York Times requires the plaintiff to prove actual malice
with convincing clarity, 135 the privilege is not an affirmative defense, like the
common-law privileges, 136 but is instead an element of the plaintiff's prima
facie case. To recover in a defamation action, public figures or public officials
See, e.g., Rebozo v. Washington Post Co., 637 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 964(1981) (close
friend of former President Nixon); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977) (the children of Ethel and
Julius Rosenberg); Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976) (Johnny Carson's wife). See also
Note, An Analysis of the Distinction Between Public Figures and Private Defamation Plaintiffs Applied to
Relatives of Public Persons, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1131 (1976).
125. This Comment will use the term "public plaintiff" to refer to both public officials and public figures.
126. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
127. For a discussion of the confusion emanating from the use of the term "actual malice," see Eaton, Tire
American Lain' of Defantation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Priner, 61 VA.
L. REV. 1349, 1370-75 (1975).
128. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
131. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
132. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
133. Since a plaintiff has the burden of proving knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity, it seems that the
plaintiff a fortiori also has the burden of proving falsity. But see Eaton, supra note I, at 138146 (argues that the
burden of proof on the issue of falsity is still an open question).
134. See L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 53, at 293 (1978). Nevertheless, this Comment will
continue to refer to the protections afforded by New York Tiunes and Gertz as privileges.
135. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 285-86 (1964).
136. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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must therefore sustain the burden of proving with convincing clarity 37 that
the defendant either knew an allegedly defamatory statement was false or at
least seriously doubted its truth.
C. The Gertz Privilege
1. Scope of the Privilege
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 38 the Supreme Court readdressed the
issues raised in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 139 Justice Brennan's plural-
ity opinion in Rosenbloom stated that the New York Times privilege was
applicable not only to public plaintiffs, but to all "matters of public or general
concern." 140 Gertz, however, explicitly rejected Rosenbloom's expansion of
the New York Times privilege, thus limiting it to discussion of public officials
and public figures. 14' Although the Court refused to extend the New York Times
privilege to discussion of private persons merely because they are involved in
matters of public concern, 142 it realized that so restricting New York Times left
defamation defendants with no protection from state imposition of strict liabil-
ity in suits brought by nonpublic plaintiffs. 143 The Court, therefore, opted for
the mere prohibition of strict liability, promulgating an intermediate standard
that prohibits the imposition of defamation liability without "fault."44
2. The Fault Requirement
The Restatement (Second) of Torts articulates "five distinct contexts in
which the question of fault may arise." 145 The Restatement, however, takes
137. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964). The Court articulated the rationale
behind the convincing clarity standard:
[Generally,] "an erroneous verdict in the defendant's favor [is no more serious] than.., an erroneous
verdict in the plaintiff's favor."..... In libel cases, however, we view an erroneous verdict for the
plaintiff as most serious. Not only does it mulct the defendant for an innocent misstatement
[a lesser standard] would create a strong impetus toward self-censorship, which the First Amend-
ment cannot tolerate.
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 50 (1971) (quoting In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
One commentator noted that the convincing clarity standard "reduces self-censorship in two related ways
as well: it facilitates summary judgment in unmeritorious cases, and it extends the power of appellate courts to
reverse jury verdicts for plaintiff." Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199, 248 (1976). Cf. Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 82
(1967) (Although the petitioner failed to object to the erroneous jury instruction, the Court examined the record
to determine the sufficiency of the evidence.).
138. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
139. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
140. Id. at 44.
141. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-48 (1974).
142. Id. at 346.
143. Id. at 346-47.
144. Id. at 347. Although this section of the Comment examines the constitutional law of defamation
without consideration of whom it protects, one must be aware that the Gertz privilege applies only to media
speakers. Id.
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B comment b (1977) [hereinafter referred to as the Re-
statement]. The five contexts are:
(1) Publication to a third party (e.g., a communication mailed directly to the defamed person
comes to the attention of a third party);
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the position that the Gertz privilege requires defendants to establish "fault" in
only three of the five contexts: a statement's falsity, its defamatory character,
and its effect on a particular plaintiff.'46
The Restatement further posits that the plaintiff must carry the burden of
proof on the fault issue.'47 Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed
the question of whether absence of fault is an affirmative defense or whether a
defamed plaintiff's case must include proof of the defendant's fault, lower
federal courts have examined the issue. For example, in Wilson v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting "Co. 48 the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff had the
burden of proving that a defendant acted with fault. 149 The Wilson court
observed that casting the Gertz fault privilege as an affirmative defense would
negate the privilege in some cases. A defendant who merely failed to meet his
burden of proof might be subject to liability without affirmative proof of fault.
Since Gertz requires that liability cannot be imposed without fault, placing the
burden of proof on the defendant would be unconstitutional. 50 The Wilson
court further held that the Gertz fault standard has two components: falsity
and carelessness. '' Thus, the private plaintiff must prove that the allegedly
defamatory remark is false and that the defendant acted with the requisite
degree of carelessness in failing to ascertain the remark's falsity.'
52
As long as strict liability is not imposed, states are free to set their own
standard of carelessness. 5 3 They have differed on whether mere negligence or
a higher degree of fault is required.'5 4 As a lower limit, however, liability for
(2) Truth or falsity of the communication (e.g., a statement is false despite a bona fide belief in its
truth);
(3) Defamatory character of the communication (e.g., a statement not defamatory on its face is
made so because of extrinsic facts unknown to the defendant);
(4) Content of the communication (e.g., a typographical error or slip of the tongue, or words with
more than one meaning); and
(5) Reference to the plaintiff (e.g., reference to another person ora fictitious person, is reasonably
understood as referring to the plaintiff).
Id. at 222.
146. Id. comments d-f.
147. Id. comment j.
148. 642 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1981).
149. Id. at 374-76.
150. Id. at 375-76.
151. Id. at 375.
152. Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B(a) (1977). Under the Restatement's approach the
"'carelessness" element consists of three sub-elements: carelessness about the statement's falsity, its defama-
tory character, and its effect on the plaintiff. The Restatement further notes that the common law already
requires intent or fault in the communication to a third party. Id. § 580B comment b. The Gertz privilege clearly
requires fault concerning falsity. 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974). See supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
The additional elements for which the Restatement requires fault may stem from Gertz' statement that
additional fault may be required for "'statements [that fall to make] substantial danger to reputation apparent."
418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974) (citing Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967)). That statement seems.
however, to be concerned mainly with what is known as defamation per quod and thus may constitutionalize the
distinction between per se and per quod liability.
153. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974); Wilson v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting. 642
F.2d 371, 375 (6th Cir. 1981).
154. States have taken at least three approaches to the standard of care demanded by the Gertz fault
requirement. The majority ofjurisdictions that have addressed the issue have settled for a negligence standard.
J. BARRON & C. DIENES. supra note 110, § 6:4, at 250. See, e.g., Troman v. Wood. 62 I11. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d
292 (1975); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580,350 A.2d 688 (1976). Other states, however, have opted for
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the defamation of a private figure cannot be imposed absent proof by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the alleged defamation was false and that the
defendant acted negligently in failing to ascertain its falsity.'
D. Constitutional Limitations on Damages
The Supreme Court in Gertz, balancing the competing interests repre-
sented by defamation law and the first amendment, also set limits on the
damages that may imposed in defamation actions. 56 At common law,
damages were presumed in actions based on libel or slander per se.157 The
Gertz Court, however, held that first amendment values outweigh an allegedly
defamed plaintiff's interest in receiving such "gratuitous awards" of
damages. 15 Thus, no defamation plaintiff is entitled to general damages ab-
sent proof of actual malice. 159 Although an injured plaintiff is not required to
prove his actual loss in monetary terms, judges or juries may award com-
pensatory damages based only on a plaintiff's "actual injury." '60
Gertz also limited state imposition of punitive damages in defamation
actions. 16 At common law, punitive damages could be assessed if the de-
fendant acted maliciously (in the sense of with ill will). 62 Gertz, however,
bars imposition of punitive damages absent proof that the defendant acted
with actual malice. 61 Since actual malice is an element of a public plaintiff's
higher standards. See, e.g., Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379
N.Y.S.2d 61(1975) (gross negligence); Walker v. Colorado Springs Suns, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450(1975)
(actual malice in matters of public concern). For a more complete cataloging of state court responses, see J.
BARRON & C. DIENES, supra note 110, §§ 6:4-6:8; Frakt, Defamation Since Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The
Einerging Common Law, 10 RUT-CAM. L.J 519 (1979); Note, The Constitutional Law, of Defamation-Recent
Developments and Suggested State Court Responses, 33 ME. L. REV. 371 (1981).
155. The Restatement takes the position that the negligence standard and proof by a mere preponderance
of the evidence are constitutionally sufficient. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B comments g, j
(1977). See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 353 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("IT]he Court
now conditions a libel action by a private person upon a showing of negligence as contrasted with a showing of
willful or reckless disregard.").
Whether Gertz requires additional proof of fault for defamations per quad (not defamatory without know-
ledge of extrinsic facts) remains unsettled. See supra notes 27 & 152. This issue was raised in Gertz but was not
resolved. 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974). The Restatement seems to take the position that Gertz also requires, in
proper cases, proof that a defendant was negligent in failing to ascertain a statement's defamatory characterand
its effect on the particular plaintiff. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B(a) (1977).
156. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974).
157. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
158. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 349-50. Although actual injury is not the equivalent of common-law special damage, Gertz
requires specific proof of damage or harm. Actual injury, not limited to "'out-of-pocket loss," includes damages
for "impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and
suffering." Id.
161. Id. at 350. The Court noted that
jury discretion [in awarding punitive damages] is limited only by the gentle rule that they not be
excessive. Consequently, juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no
relation to the actual harm caused. And they remain free to use their discretion selectively to punish
expressions of unpopular views.
162. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
163. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
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prima facie case,'6 this limitation does not affect defamation suits brought by
public plaintiffs. Under Gertz, however, states may validly impose liability
with proof of fault less than actual malice.165 So although private plaintiffs
may recover compensatory damages on proof of mere fault, they may not
recover punitive damages absent proof that the defendant acted with actual
malice,'66
II. THE PROBLEM
While a libel disseminated through the mass media may be the most likely
to attract the public's attention, defamations can arise in other contexts. Thus
far this Comment has examined constitutional defamation law without dis-
cussion of to whom the protection extends. Since Gertz was implicitly limited
to defamation actions brought against publishers and broadcasters'67-
persons shielded by freedom of the press-the question whether other first
amendment activity is similarly privileged remains unanswered.
The first amendment protects four types of verbal expression: the free-
doms of religion, speech, and press, and the right to petition the government
for redress of grievances.'6 Libels or slanders, however, can arise in any of
these contexts. The following, for example, can all give rise to potential
defamation liability: a minister's sermon or a discussion during a church
committee meeting (religion); a friendly discussion at a local tavern or a
statement made during a P.T.A. meeting (speech); or a letter to a congress-
man or a lobbyist's pitch to a legislator (right to petition). The question is
whether under New York Times and Gertz these types of activities are entitled
to the same degree of protection afforded the press. Some courts have found
the New York Times and Gertz rules inappropriate in nonmedia contexts. The
problem is illustrated in two lines of cases reaching dichotomous results. The
first series of decisions hold that nonmedia speech is entitled to either less or
none of the protection afforded by New York Times and Gertz.' 69 The second
164. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
165. Despite its acknowledgment that 'jury discretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacer-
bates the danger of media self-censorship,'" the Court declined the opportunity to abolish punitive damages.
Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). The argument for total abolition of punitive damages,
however, has been made. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 81-86 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
Furthermore, at least one state court has held punitive damages impermissible in defamation actions under
the state constitution. Hall v. May Dep't Stores, 292 Or. 131, 637 P.2d 126 (1981). States that do not follow the
Oregon rule must still determine the situations in which punitive damage awards will be appropriate. It seems
probable that in addition to the Gertz actual malice requirement malice (in the sense of ill will) will also be
required as a matter of state law. See Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Cal.
1977), aJJ'd, 623 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (198 1). Thus, in the presence of both actual
malice and common-law malice, states are likely to retain punitive damages as a means of deterring and
punishing malicious dafamation.
166. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
167. See, e.g., id. at 347, 350.
168. See supra notes 6 & 10.
169. See infra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
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line culminated in a recent decision that held that the right to petition gives
rise to an absolute defamation privilege.'70
Occupying one end of the spectrum is the Supreme Court's holding in
Gertz, implicitly limited to publishers and broadcasters. The opinion has
caused confusion and has led to disparate treatment of defamation defendants
in the lower courts. 7 ' The precise issue is whether the New York Times and
Gertz privileges are applicable to nonmedia defendants-speakers to whom
the freedom of the press is inapplicable. At least four different positions have
been taken on the issue: (1) neither the New York Times nor Gertz privileges
apply to nonmedia defendants; 172 (2) the New York Times privilege applies to
nonmedia defendants, but Gertz does not; 173 (3) the New York Times privilege
applies to nonmedia defendants, but Gertz applies to nonmedia defendants
only in matters of public interest; 174 and (4) New York Times and Gertz both
apply to nonmedia defendants.' 75
The Supreme Court has refused to resolve this issue despite numerous
opportunities to do so. The Court's refusal to apply the Gertz privilege in
nonmedia contexts could have far-reaching results. States remain free to im-
pose defamation liability on nonmedia defendants even though those defen-
dants act without fault. More incredibly, states are free to impose defamation
liability on true statements. 176 In an attempt to avoid these potentially dra-
conian results, lower courts analyzing the various Supreme Court defamation
decisions have tried to explain the apparent distinction the Court draws be-
tween media and nonmedia defendants. This Comment will demonstrate that
the Court's distinction is illusory, with no basis in either policy or precedent.
Webb v. Fury 177 occupies the other end of the spectrum, imbuing the right
170. Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 37 (W. Va. 1981).
171. See infra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., Calero v. Del Chem. Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487,228 N.W.2d 737 (1975). See also Stewart. "Or o.f
the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 635 (1975).
173. See Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 107, 593 P.2d 777, 783 (1979) (New York Tines applies to all
defendants); Harley-Davidson Motorsports v. Markley, 279 Or. 361,368,568 P.2d 1359, 1364 (1977) (Gertz does
not apply to nonmedia defendants).
174. Terms or criteria other than "public interest" have also been used. Several commentators have
suggested that courts should analyze the subject matter or context of the speech in question in determining
whether the privilege is applicable. See Kalven, The Reasonable Man And Tile First Amendment: Hill, Butts,
and Walker, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 267 (political speech); Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First
Amendment Methodology, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 915 (1978) (general balancing of first amendment interests and
the values served by defamation law); Note, Mediaocracy and Mistrust: Extending New York Times Dejamna-
tion Protection to Nonmnedia Defendants, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1876 (1982) (balancing the interests of the speaker,
his audience, and the target of the defamatory remark).
175. See, e.g., Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 580A comment h, 580B comment e (1977).
176. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), "The Court ... left open the question
whether the [first amendment] require[s] that truth be recognized as a defense in a defamation action brought by
a private person .... ." Id. at 490. An across-the-board application of New York Thnes and Gertz, however,
would mandate a constitutional defense of truth. Public officials and public figures would be required to prove
that the allegedly defamatory statement was false and that the defendant acted with "actual malice" in failing to
ascertain its falsity. Private persons would be required to prove only that the defendant was at fault in publishing
a false and defamatory statement. See Wilson v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 642 F.2d 371 (6th Cir.
1981), and supra text accompanying notes 148-55.
177. 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981).
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to petition with protection beyond that afforded by New York Times and
Gertz. The United States Supreme Court's most significant right to petition
decisions have only tangentially been based on constitutional law. Under the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine'78 the Court held that as a matter of statutory
interpretation antitrust law does not prohibit lobbying or other attempts to
seek government action even if that activity is undertaken with the intent of
reducing or hindering competition.' 79 In Webb the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, relying primarily on an intermediate series of decisions that
expanded the Noerr-Pennington doctrine beyond the confines of antitrust
law, held that the right to petition, guaranteed by the United States and West
Virginia Constitutions,'" gives rise to an absolute defamation privilege.' 8 '
The Webb court, however, acknowledged that if the petitioning had been a
mere sham the privilege would have been forfeited. 2 Narrowly interpreting
Noerr-Pennington's sham exception, the court noted that the defendant's
petitioning was legitimately directed toward influencing governmental policy
and thus was not susceptible to defamation liability. 83 By simultaneously
extending the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to defamation law and narrowly
construing its sham exception, the Webb court granted defamatory speech a
level of constitutional protection never before recognized.
Ill. A CASE FOR A UNITARY STANDARD
A. The Basis: The Unitary Nature of the First Amendment
In Thomas v. Collins 84 the Supreme Court described the relationship
between the first amendment freedoms: "It was not by accident or coinci-
dence that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single
guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for
redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable. They
are cognate rights." 85 The Supreme Court has consistently viewed the dif-
ferent first amendment freedoms as merely different aspects of the same
guaranty-the right of free expression.
Addressing the importance of the right to petition, the Supreme Court
noted that "the very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right
on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public
affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances." 86 The Court thus recog-
178. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
179. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135 (1961).
180. U.S. CONST. amend. I; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 16.
181. 282 S.E.2d 28, 43 (W. Va. 1981).
182. Id. at 40-43.
183. Id. At 43.
184. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
185. Id. at 530 (emphasis added).
186. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875).
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nized the central role that the right to petition plays within the scheme of the
Bill of Rights. In further emphasizing that role, the Court noted that
the rights to assemble peaceably and to petition for a redress of grievances are
among the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights. These
rights, moreover, are intimately connected, both in origin and inpurpose, with the
other First Amendment rights of free speech and free press.
So while the Court has emphasized the importance of the rights of petition and
assembly, it has done so by placing them on an equal footing with the more
highly visible rights of free speech and press.
The Supreme Court has also refused to grant members of the press
greater rights than the general public. The press has argued for special rights
in two contexts: access to news and protection from intrusion. The Court,
however, has refused to recognize a special privilege in either context. The
Court has consistently held that "[t]he Constitution does not ... accord the
press special access to information not shared by members of the public
generally." '8 Additionally, the Court has refused to fashion a special press
privilege shielding newsmen or newsrooms from grand jury investigations,'s
police searches,'0 or civil discovery.' 9'
The Gertz Court's apparent distinction between media and nonmedia
speakers is inconsistent with the Court's longstanding position that the first
amendment is a single guaranty. This Comment will demonstrate that the New
York Times and Gertz privileges should protect all speakers similarly, regard-
less of whether the speaker is a member of the press or whether the speaker's
audience is the government or his neighbor.
B. Defamation and Nonmedia Speech
When New York Times was decided in 1964, one commentator noted that
the decision might "prove to be the best and most important [decision the
Court] has ever produced in the realm of freedom of speech.' Others have
argued that New York Times and its progeny created only a press privilege,
which one commentator has labelled the creation of a "mediaocracy.",93
Notably, former Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart stated that neither
187. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
188. Pell v. Procunier. 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974). See also Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe v.
Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843, 857 (1974).
189. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
190. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
191. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
192. Kalven, The New York Tines Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning othe First Amendment," 1964
SUP. CT. REV. 191, 194 (emphasis added).
193. Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
915, 923 (1978). For one commentator's view that New York Times and its progeny have created merely a media
privilege, see Note, First Amendment Protection Against Libel Actions: Distinguishing Media and Non-Media
Defendants, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 902, 924-38 (1974).
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New York Times nor its progeny gave "an individual [rather than the institu-
tional press] any immunity from liability for either libel or slander."' 94
There are three relevant considerations in determining whether the crea-
tion of a special media privilege is appropriate: precedent, policy, and prac-
ticality. Looking first to precedent, primary support for the proposition that
Gertz does not apply to nonmedia defendants can be found in the language of
the opinion itself.' 95 The Court's refusal to resolve an issue not before it-
precedent by omission- 96 is not, however, a sound basis for distinguishing
between media and nonmedia defendants.
The Court has already weighed the competing interests that arise in the
discussion of public and private plaintiffs. 97 Even if Gertz' balancing of first
amendment values is limited to speech protected by freedom of the press, the
balance should not be different for nonmedia speech, given the unitary nature
of the first amendment.
Former Justice Stewart and others advocating the creation of a media-
ocracy base their arguments on the idea that the absence of such a privilege
would make the freedom of the press a "constitutional redundancy," 9 given
the free speech clause. That argument is simply not viable, since the framers
thought of freedom of speech and press as interchangeable. '99
Herbert v. Lando, '2  decided after Gertz, is perhaps the most significant
decision indicating the unitary nature of the first amendment within the field
of defamation law. In Herbert the Supreme Court refused to recognize a
special press evidentiary privilege barring civil discovery of a media defen-
dant's editorial process. -' Since public plaintiffs have the onerous burden of
establishing actual malice,02 information relevant to that issue is necessary to
the plaintiff's prima facie case. Finding the press' claim for preferential treat-
ment without merit, the Court held that "[c]ourts have traditionally admitted
any direct or indirect evidence relevant to the state of mind of the defendant
and necessary to defeat a conditional privilege or enhance damages. The rules
are applicable to the press and other defendants alike. 20 3
A brief reading of the New York Times-Gertz line demonstrates that the
exclusion of nonmedia defendants from the protection of the New York Times
194. Stewart. "Or of the Press." 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 635 (1975) (emphasis in original). Reflecting on
Stewart's position, one commentator noted the irony that the decision "regarded as the best and most important
opinion in the realm of freedom of speech is described by [former] Justice Stewart as having nothing to do with
freedom of speech." Shiffrin. supra note 193. at 921.
195. Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc., 418 U.S. 323. 347, 350 (1974) (the requirement of fault and the limitations
on damages are limited to defamation actions brought against publishers or broadcasters).
196. Id. at 325. (Gertz concerned an action against a magazine).
197. See supra notes 47-78 and accompanying text.
198. Stewart. supra note 194, at 633.
199. See, e.g., L. LEVY. LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 174 (1960); Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press a
Redundanc.': What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?. 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 639-41 (1975).
200. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
201. Id. at 169.
202. See supra notes 126-37 and accompanying text.
203. 441 U.S. 153, 165 (1979).
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actual malice privilege is barely supportable. In the pre-Gertz decisions the
Supreme Court consistently held that the New York Times privilege was
applicable to nonmedia defendants. 3 4 Most lower courts therefore concur
that New York Times and Curtis Publishing Co. apply to both media and
nonmedia defendants.05
One commentator observed, as a basis for distinction, that media and
nonmedia speech differ in three significant ways: in their scope of publication,
function, and characteristics of their speakers.2 6 The first, difference in the
scope of publication, cannot entitle the media to preferential treatment. While
a nonmedia defendant's ability to limit his audience may reduce the potential
for reputational damage, 2 7 it will generally not affect the issue of liability.
Further, because a defamatory statement uttered by the media is widely dis-
seminated, it may have a more devastating effect on a private person's repu-
tation than backyard gossip, the form of speech generally seen as least deserv-
ing of first amendment protection.
20 8
The second aspect distinguishing media from nonmedia speech is the
function served by the institutional media: dissemination of information to the
public.20 9 While commentators acknowledge that the press serves a valuable
service by providing "organized, expert scrutiny of government ' 210 and other
information necessary to a self-governing state, they overlook the press'
underlying motivation-profit. The press is not a collection of nonprofit
organizations blazing trails of enlightenment, but is instead a collection of
profit-seeking businesses.
Another argument that the press and its apologists advance in support of
a special defamation privilege based on the media's unique function is the
media's need to circulate "hot news. ' 2 1' The media often operates under
severe time restraints; however, those restraints are largely the result of
competitive pressure. For example, if a newspaper takes the time to verify all
its stories, it runs the risk of losing its audience to another publication that can
produce the news more quickly. "Mediaocrats" therefore argue that the press
should be able to act quickly, even at the risk of defaming the innocent. This
argument, however, simply begs the question. If all potential defamation
defendants are bound by the same standard of care, no speaker will be given a
204. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727. 730 (1968); Garrison v. Louisiana. 379 U.S. 64, 76(1964); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Cf. cases cited supra note 83.
205. See, e.g., Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580,587,350 A.2d 688, 695 (1976). See also Wheeler v.
Green, 286 Or. 99, 107-09, 593 P.2d 777, 783-85 (1979) (New York Times is applicable to all defendants although
Gertz is not).
206. See, e.g., Note, supra note 193, at 924-38.
207. Id. at 926.
208. See, e.g., Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment. 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205.
1224-25 (1976).
209. See, e.g., Note, supra note 193, at 926-29.
210. Stewart, supra note 172, at 634.
211. Note, supra note 193, at 933.
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competitive edge. Even former Justice Stewart's position that the press, as a
business, is protected under the Constitution 212 does not affect this analysis.
A final argument in favor of preferential press treatment based on its
unique function, is the role of the press as a disseminator of the information
that the public needs to function effectively in a self-governing state.1 3 The
press certainly serves that function; nonmedia speech, however, plays an
equally important role in facilitating the use of valuable information. The
public must not only receive information from news sources, but must also be
able to digest, understand, and use that information through discussion and
criticism. It is absurd to consider that a letter published in a letters-to-the-
editor column of a newspaper would be constitutionally protected,214 while
the same words spoken to a friend or neighbor would not.
The argument that members of the press are "responsible publishers"2 ,5
is a non sequitur. If the press is more responsible than nonmedia speakers,
then there is no need to afford the media greater protection. The responsibility
stems from the institutional press' duty to keep the public informed of crucial
information of public concern. Certainly the press serves that function; how-
ever, it also serves less glorious functions. Why should gossip published in
so-called "scandal sheets" or "society pages" be given greater protection
than backyard gossip? It seems very unlikely that the Supreme Court will
accord speech greater protection simply because it is printed in a newspaper.
Such a result is an absurdity.
Another argument advanced by mediaocrats in support of a special
defamation privilege is that the press has a greater interest in disseminating
news than its audience has in discussing the same news. That position gives
the institutional press greater protection than, for example, the person who
repeats a news story to a friend in an attempt to educate him concerning his
vote in an upcoming election. Shielding the press with greater protection in
such an instance serves no value. That result would only encourage media
brainwashing and audience sterility-the natural result of an audience's ex-
clusive reliance on the institutional media and lack of interaction with other
persons. As the Supreme Court has noted, the first amendment guarantees
"individuals [the] right to make their thoughts public and put them before the
community."21
6
The rationale underlying New York Times and Gertz, therefore, will be
frustrated if nonmedia speech is completely denied constitutional protection.
In New York Times the Court noted the importance of debate and discussion
212. Stewart, supra note 194. at 633 ("The publishing business is, in short, the only organized private
business that is given explicit constitutional protection.").
213. Id. at 634.
214. At least one commentator has concluded that anyone who uses the media to communicate with the
public is entitled to the same protection generally accorded the media. Hill, supra note 208, at 1223-24.
215. See, e.g., Note. supra note 193. at 930.
216. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts. 388 U.S. 130. 149 (1967).
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of public issues.217 Since the press does not have a monopoly on the discus-
sion of public issues, most commentators advocate the protection of non-
media speech in appropriate cases-although they disagree over what consti-
tutes the touchstone for constitutional protection of nonmedia speech, they
do agree that the constitutional defamation privileges do not die at the news-
paper office door.218
Creation of a subject-matter determinative privilege for nonmedia speech
poses both analytical and practical problems. The Gertz Court found that a
public interest analysis was unmanageable. The Court "doubt[ed] the wisdom
of committing ... to the conscience of judges" 2' 9 the task of determining
"what information is relevant to self-government.- 220 Although some com-
mentators have attempted to articulate 'other standards for determining what
nonmedia speech should be protected,'22  each theory necessitates some de-
gree of subject-matter regulation and requires some degree of value judgment
concerning the worth of particular speech.
Even if the New York Times and Gertz privileges are held to apply to only
media speech, a difficult question must be answered: Which speakers are
protected by the freedom of the press? The Court has noted that "liberty of
the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a
mimeograph [as well as] the large metropolitan publisher." 2_ Application of
any standard of first amendment protection other than a unitary standard will
inevitably necessitate a case-by-case evaluation of the merits of particular
speech.
No viable basis exists in policy, precedent, or practicality for according
the press greater constitutional protection than nonmedia speakers. Absent
application of Gertz to nonmedia defendants, states are free to impose strict
liability in defamation actions, conceivably even for true statements.
Gertz' extension to nonmedia defendants would end in two results: first, the
defense of truth would be constitutionalized so that courts could never impose
defamation liability based on either true statements or innocent falsehoods; 224
217. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("We consider this case against the
background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be un-
inhibited.").
218. See sources cited supra note 174.
219. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
220. Id.
221. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
222. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704-05 (1972). One commentator observed that "[olne person's
newspaper may be another's handbill." Frakt, The Evolving Law of Dejamation: New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond, 6 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 471. 510 (1975). See also Eaton, The
American Law of Defamnation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Priner. 61 VA.
L. REV. 1349, 1416-18 (1975).
223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B comment e (1977). See also id. § 580A comment h. Cj.
Hill, supra note 208, at 1227 ("It is possible that the first amendment rule will be adopted [for nonmedia speech]
simply in order to avoid the necessity of deciding on a case-by-case basis whether a particular communication is
or is not subject to [the constitutional rules]."); Eaton. supra note 222, at 1417 (the ultimate expansion of
Gertz ... seems predictable.").
224. See supra notes 145-55 and accompanying text.
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and second, damages would be limited to compensation for actual injury,
absent proof of actual malice. 22 Both results would fulfill the prophecy that
New York Times would have a major impact on free speech.
IV. DEFAMATION AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION
Prior to Webb v. Fry 226 most commentators believed that the Noerr-
Pennington227 "privilege" was lost upon proof of actual malice. 228 The
Supreme Court's statement that "malicious libel enjoys no constitutional
protection in any context"' 229 supports this conclusion. In Webb, however,
the court granted petitioning activity an absolute defamation privilege by
drawing an analogy from the Noerr-Pennington doctrine of antitrust im-
munity. -30
A. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc. ,3' the defendants, a group of railroad companies, mounted a lobbying and
publicity campaign seeking "the adoption and retention of laws and law en-
forcement practices destructive of the trucking business ' ,232 for the purpose
of reducing competition. Despite the plaintiffs' allegation that the campaign
was malicious,23' the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Sherman
Antitrust Act was inapplicable to "mere attempts to influence the passage or
enforcement of laws.''2 4 Finding the allegation of malice irrelevant, the
Supreme Court stated that
[a] construction of the Sherman Act that would disqualify people from taking a
public position on matters in which they are financially interested would thus
deprive the government of a valuable source of information and, at the same time,
deprive the people of their right to petition in the very instances in which that right
may be of the most importance to them.
35
The antitrust immunity is not lost merely because the government action
sought has an anticompetitive purpose or effect.
The Supreme Court, however, has spoken on the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine only in the context of antitrust law. Despite its expansion by other
225. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
226. 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981).
227. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Pennington. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
228. See Costilo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington Defense, 66 MICH. L. REV. 333.
348 (1967); Fischel. Antitrust Liabilityfor Attempts to Infhence Government Action: The Basis and Linits of
the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 80. 103 (1977); Walden, More about Noerr-Lobbying,
Antitrust and the Right to Petition, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1211, 1247 (1967).
229. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am.. Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 63 (1966) (emphasis added).
230. 282 S.E.2d 28, 43 (W. Va. 1981).
231. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
232. Id. at 129.
233. Id. at 135.
234. Id. at 139.
235. Id. at 138.
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courts, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is not a matter of pure constitutional
law. Basing its analysis on a statutory interpretation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, the Noerr Court held that "the right of petition is one of the freedoms
protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to
Congress an intent to invade these freedoms.- 23 6 The Court did not hold that
the right to petition mandated the existence of an antitrust immunity, or that a
provision in the antitrust laws inclusive of petitioning activity would be un-
constitutional. Instead, the Court merely interpreted the Sherman Act to
avoid any possible constitutional conflict.2
7
The Court expanded Noerr in United Mine Workers of America v.
Pennington,2 38 which held that "Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a con-
certed effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose."
'2 9
Despite this expansion, the Court has failed to suggest that the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine is anything other than a matter of statutory interpre-
tation.
Although the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, as articulated by the Court,
relates only to antitrust law, 240 some lower courts have expanded it beyond
the confines 24 of antitrust law. This expansion has, in effect, constitutional-
ized the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Although most courts facing the issue
agree that the first amendment affords petitioning activity protection in con-
texts other than antitrust, 242 problems arise when they attempt to draw anal-
ogies from the factual vacuum of the Noerr-Pennington decisions. If the
Noerr-Pennington immunity is to become a defense in nonantitrust contexts,
the rationale and policy considerations underlying the doctrine must be re-
examined.
Sierra Club v. Butz,243 which concerned a suit for tortious business inter-
ference, was the first decision the Webb court relied on to justify the recog-
nition of an absolute defamation privilege. Using sweeping language, the
Sierra Club court held that civil liability could never be imposed upon validpetitioning activity.244 Although recognizing that the New York Times priv-
ilege is lost upon a showing of actual malice, the Sierra Club court relied on
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
239. Id. at 670.
240. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); California Motor Transp. Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965):
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
241. See bira notes 243-51 and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 615 (8th Cir. 1980); Stem v. United
States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1342-46 (7th Cir. 1977); Sawmill Products, Inc. v. Town of Cicero. 477 F.
Supp. 636, 642 (N.D. III. 1979); Weiss v. Willow Tree Civic Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 803. 816-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Aknin v. Phillips, 404 F. Supp. 1150, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934, 938-39 (N.D.
Cal. 1972); Arlington Heights Nat'l Bank v. Arlington Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 37 Ill. 2d 546. 549. 229
N.E.2d 514, 517 (1967).
243. 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
244. Id. at 939.
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language in Noerr, providing that malice does not destroy the antitrust
immunity, 245 to support its holding that the first amendment protects "mali-
cious" petitioning. The court, however, did not resolve whether statements
made with knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity, hence with actual
malice, were to be similarly protected. If the Sierra Club court intended to
extend Noerr-Pennington to protect actual malice, the court failed to ad-
equately distinguish New York Times.
In Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc.2 46 and Gorman Towers, Inc. v.
Bogoslavsky24 7 federal civil rights statutes were held inapplicable to petition-
ing activity. 248 If the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is to be extended to areas of
law other than antitrust, the expansion should be limited to cases of statutory
interpretation, avoiding, when possible, potential conflicts with the right to
petition. For example, in Stern the court dealt with a potential conflict with
the right to petition, stating that "[i]t is basic to federal jurisprudence that
courts must seek any reasonable construction of a statute that is consistent
with its legislative purpose so as to avoid serious constitutional doubt" 2 49; and
thus it held section 1985 of the Federal Civil Rights Act '50 inapplicable to peti-
tioning activity. 25' Despite the use of broader language, the Stern and Gorman
Towers holdings are relatively narrow. One encounters a more difficult prob-
lem when the Noerr-Pennington defense is asserted in a defamation suit.
B. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine's Sham Exception
The Noerr-Pennington defense is unavailable when ostensibly valid peti-
tioning activity is a mere sham. 252 In Noerr the Supreme Court held that the
antitrust immunity was applicable to the defendant's petitioning activity de-
spite the defendant's malicious, anticompetitive intent.253 The Court, how-
ever, laid the groundwork for excluding certain types of petitioning activity
from the antitrust immunity by stating that "it]here may be situations in
which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing govern-
ment action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a com-petitor." 254
The Supreme Court expressly acknowledged a sham exception in Cali-
fornia Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited.255 The defendants were
245. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight. Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139 (1961).
246. 547 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir. 1977).
247. 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980).
248. Stem v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1344 (7th Cir. 1977); Gorman Towers, Inc. v.
Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 615 (8th Cir. 1980).
249. 547 F.2d 1329, 1344 (7th Cir. 1977).
250. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976).
251. 547 F.2d 1329, 1344 (7th Cir. 1977).
252. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511 (1972).
253. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight. Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139-41 (1961).
254. id. at 144.
255. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
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alleged to have instituted spurious judicial and administrative proceedings for
the purpose of harassing their competitors.256 The defendants nevertheless
asserted that their conduct was insulated from antitrust liability under Noerr-
Pennington.25 7 The Court, however, held that although access to courts and
administrative agencies is protected by the first amendment right of peti-
tion, 258 petitioning activity that is a mere sham2 9 or a pretext for achieving
"substantive evils" 26 is unprotected by the Noerr-Pennington immunity. The
Court thus concluded that petitioning activity engaged in for the mere purpose
of harassing competitors falls within the Noerr-Pennington sham excep-
tion. 261
Unfortunately, because both California Motor and Otter Tail Power Co.
v. United States,262 the Court's only other sham exception decision, con-
cerned petitioning activity directed toward depriving competitors of meaning-
ful access to courts or administrative agencies, some lower courts have inter-
preted the sham exception very narrowly. 263 For example, in deciding
Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive
Board of Culinary Workers261 the Ninth Circuit held that the sham exception
"does not extend to direct lobbying efforts. . . , but only to publicity cam-
paigns. -_65 Retreating slightly from that position, the Franchise Realty court
added that the sham exception might also be applicable when "the defendant
is not seeking official action by a governmental body, [thus undertaking]
'nothing more' than an attempt to interfere with the business relationships of a
competitor. '- 2 66 The second position is clearly preferable; the Constitution
should not be interpreted to protect any type of sham petitioning activity,
whether done directly or indirectly through a publicity campaign.
California Motor seems to indicate that the standard for determining a
sham varies, depending on the branch of government petitioned. 67 The Court
stated that "misrepresentations, condoned in the political arena, are not
immunized when used in the adjudicatory process. ' 2 "3 Apparently, petition-
ing activity that results in an "abuse" of the adjudicatory function of either
the courts or administrative agencies constitutes a sham.269 Justice Stewart's
256. Id. at 509.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 510.
259. Id. at 511.
260. Id. at 515.
261. Id. at 515-16.
262. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
263. E.g., Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary
Workers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1080.
266. Id. at 1081.
267. 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972). For a more detailed discussion of this idea, see Fischel. Antitrust Liabiliyjor
Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine. 45 U. CHI.
L. REV. 80 (1977).
268. 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972).
269. Id.
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concurrence in California Motor, while avoiding the evasive concept of abuse,
suggests that the "misrepresentations of fact or law to these tribunals 27
might cause the activity to fall within the sham exception.
In Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America,27'
an antitrust action, the Fifth Circuit assimilated the variant views of the sham
exception and correctly held that the Noerr-Pennington immunity is lost
when the petitioning activity is either not "designed to influence policy" 272 or
when it results in an "abuse of the administrative process. ' 273 Even if Noerr-
Pennington is a doctrine of constitutional law, rather than a doctrine of stat-
utory interpretation, the right to petition should never protect any form of
"sham" petitioning. The test for the sham exception should be construed
broadly to include all types of sham petitioning, regardless of the particular
government entity being petitioned. A grievance addressed to the government
with the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of its
truth, hence with actual malice, is clearly sham petitioning that should not be
entitled to Noerr-Pennington protection.
C. Webb and its Possible Ramifications
A conflict arises when, on one hand, the Supreme Court holds the first
amendment a single guaranty, 274 and on the other the Webb court suggests
that the right to petition is entitled to a defamation privilege of greater scope
than the other first amendment freedoms. 275 The Supreme Court's holding
that the "First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, ' 276 is
equally applicable to all first amendment activity. All freedoms of expression
need breathing space if they are to remain robust and uninhibited. While the
threat of a potential defamation suit will undoubtedly deter some expression,
the Supreme Court has held that the New York Times and Gertz conditional
defamation privileges are sufficient protection. 27 The Webb court, however,
failed to adequately explain why the right to petition is entitled to greater
protection.
By recognizing an absolute defamation privilege for petitioning activity,
the Webb court recognized a constitutional right to give false information to
the government. Webb is thus inconsistent with both the Supreme Court's
holding that false statements of fact have no constitutional value 278 and the
theory of a unitary first amendment.279 One potential explanation for this
inconsistency is that petitioning activity is political speech that should be
270. Id. at 517 (Stewart. J.. concurring).
271. 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971). cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
272. Id. at 1298.
273. Id.
274. Thomas v. Collins. 323 U.S. 516. 530 (1945). See also supra text accompanying notes 184-91.
275. Webb v. Fury. 282 S.E.2d 28. 43 (W. Va. 1981).
276. NAACP v. Button. 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
277. Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc.. 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
278. Id. at 340.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 184-91.
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accorded a higher level of first amendment protection. For example, the
Gorman Towers court seemed to equate Noerr-Pennington's reach with
political activity.8 0 No political speech theory, however, demands recogni-
tion of an absolute defamation privilege for all political speech. The Supreme
Court expressly repudiated that idea in New York Times and Gertz.28'
Further, the right to petition is not limited to political matters.2 2 Although the
right to petition often coincides with the concept of political speech, the two
are not identical.
The Supreme Court has consistently refused to extend constitutional
protection to lies.283 Although the Court has recognized an absolute defama-
• 2"84
tion privilege for certain federal government officials," the purpose of the
privilege is not to protect the official himself, but instead to protect the "effec-
tive administration of policies of government." 2 85 Recognition of an absolute
defamation privilege for petitioning activity would encourage persons seeking
to influence the government to use distortion and misrepresentation in their
arguments. No one should have a constitutional right to give false information
to the government. The policy that some falsehoods should be protected in
order "to protect speech that matters ' 2 8 6 requires that only errors-not
knowing or reckless falsehoods-be protected.
Although it has no logical basis in either policy or precedent, Webb could
have a far-reaching and unexpected impact on defamation law. If courts
recognize an absolute petitioning privilege, with a narrowly drawn sham ex-
ception, the constitutionality of the well-established common-law torts of
287 28
abuse of process, 87 malicious prosecution, 88 and wrongful civil proceedings(civil malicious prosecution)28 9 might be jeopardized. These torts, based on
280. Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 615 (8th Cir. 1980).
281. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974). Bat see Shiffrin, Defainatory Non-Media
Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 915, 917 (1978) (citing A. MEIKLEIOHN.
POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960)). For a fuller discussion of the relationship between the first amendment and
"political speech," see BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and
Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978).
282. "The grievances for redress of which the right of petition was insured... are not solely religious or
political ones." United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967). A
rationale for recognizing a wide scope to the right to petition is that "[it matters not that the subject of the
grievance may not be political, in the sense of raising public policy issues .... Indeed, the fact that a grievance
may not arouse sufficient public concern to generate political support makes the individualized exercise of the
right to petition all the more important." Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1343 (7th Cir.
1977).
283. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
284. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). For a full discussion of the government defamation priv-
ileges, see generally L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION §§ 72-75 (1978).
285. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569-76 (1959). See also supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
286. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323. 341 (1974).
287. Abuse of process occurs when "one ... uses a legal process, whether criminal or civil, against
another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 682 (1977).
288. Malicious prosecution occurs when "a private person ... initiates or procures the institution of
criminal proceedings against another who is not guilty of the offense charged, without probable cause and for a
purpose other than bringing an offender to justice .... RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 653 (1977).
289. Wrongful use of civil proceedings occurs when "one ... takes an active part in the initiation, con-
tinuation or procurement of civil proceedings against another ... [and] he acts without probable cause, and
primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings
are based .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 (1977).
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misuse of the judicial system,2  would clearly fall within the petitioning priv-
ilege recognized in Sierra Club v. Butz. 29' The issue is whether they fall within
California Motor's292 sham exception.'
In California Motor the Supreme Court held that certain "illegal and
reprehensible practice[s] which may corrupt the administrative or judicial
processes'2 94 fall outside the scope of Noerr-Pennington protection, especial-
ly if used to deprive another of meaningful access to courts or agencies.295
Abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and wrongful civil proceedings,
however, do not bar access to the courts. On the contrary, these torts force a
defendant to appear in court to vindicate himself. Further, under Noerr-
Pennington a plaintiffs intent is irrelevant. 29 Under a broad definition of the
sham exception, 297 those actions might constitute abuse of the judicial pro-
cess-hence, a sham per se; a doctrine that could conceivably give constitu-
tional protection to those abuses must be rethought.
D. Application of the Unitaiy Standard in Petitioning Cases
The Supreme Court's statement that "malicious libel enjoys no constitu-
tional protection in any context" 298 both illuminates the inconsistency created
by Webb and recommends a possible resolution. The constitutional protection
for defamatory speech is a conditional privilege lost upon proof of actual
malice or fault299-not an absolute privilege. Explaining the scope and pur-
pose of the New York Times privilege, the Supreme Court stated that
[e]ven where the utterance is false, the great principles of the Constitution which
secure freedom of expression in this area preclude attaching adverse conse-
quences to any except the knowing or reckless falsehood. Debate on public issues
will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the risk that it will be proved in
court that he spoke out of hatred; even if he did speak out of hatred, utterances
honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and ascertainment of
truth.3W
Thus, although the first amendment protects statements made with malice in
the sense of ill will, it does not protect statements made with actual malice.
The policy underlying the constitutional defamation privileges disappears
when actual malice is present. As the Supreme Court stated, "[The constitu-
tional guarantees can tolerate sanctions against calculated falsehood without
290. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 1, §§ 119-121.
291. 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
292. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
293. For an excellent discussion of the relationship between the "misuse of legal proceedings" torts and
the Noerr-Pennington antitrust immunity, see Note, Limiting the Antitrust Immunityf.or Concerted Attempts to
Influence Courts and Adjudicatory Agencies: Analogies to Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process, 86
HARV. L. REV. 715 (1973).
294. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
295. Id. at 513.
296. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657. 670 (1965).
297. See, e.g., Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminium Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286, 1298 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
298. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 63 (1966).
299. See supra text accompanying notes 125-55.
300. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964).
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significant impairment of their essential function," ' ' because "[a]lthough
honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the
right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately
published should enjoy a like immunity.- 30 2 These ideas, reaffirmed in
Gertz,3  suggest that the Webb court erred in concluding that the first
amendment right of petition gives rise to an absolute privilege.
The conflict between Webb's interpretation of Noerr-Pennington and the
Supreme Court's position on malicious libel could be resolved by excluding
statements made with actual malice from Noerr-Pennington protection. Peti-
tioning activity engaging statements made with either knowledge or reckless
disregard of their falsity should be interpreted as sham petitioning falling
outside the scope of the Noerr-Pennington defense.
The Webb dissent3°4 suggested such an approach earlier adopted by the
Illinois Supreme Court in Arlington Heights National Bank v. Arlington
Heights Federal Savings & Loan Association,3"5 a case cited and quickly
dismissed by the Webb majority. The Arlington Heights court began its
analysis with the premise that Noerr protects petitioning in contexts other
than antitrust. Noticing that the right of petition is "not inherently abso-
lute, ' , 306 and analogizing from New York Times, the court held that "the right
of petition should likewise be construed as only conditionally privileged.
30 7
Relying on Thomas v. Collins for the principle that the first amendment
freedoms constitute a single guaranty 3 0 the Arlington Heights court con-
cluded that the petitioning privilege does not shield actual malice.3 03 9
The privilege recognized in Arlington Heights rests on a sound legal
foundation.3t The right to petition is not absolute. The Supreme Court has
specifically held that "[n]either the right to associate nor the right to partic-
ipate in political activities is absolute." 31 Several examples demonstrate that
the right to petition is not absolute. Paying government officials to act in a
particular manner is a type of petitioning, yet bribery is a crime and the
constitutionality of criminal bribery statutes is beyond question. Additionally,
in United States v. Harris312 the United States Supreme Court upheld the
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act,31 3 which requires the registration of all
301. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967) (emphasis added).
302. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
303. 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
304. 282 S.E.2d 28, 46 (W. Va. 1981) (Neely. J., dissenting).
305. 37 Il. 2d 546, 229 N.E.2d 514 (1967).
306. Id. at 550, 229 N.E.2d at 517.
307. Id.
308. 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
309. 37 Ill. 2d 546, 551, 229 N.E.2d 514, 517 (1967).
310. In Swaaley v. United States, 376 F.2d 857 (Ct. Cl. 1967). the court reached the same conclusion.
Without dealing with Noerr-Pennington, the Swaaley court held that the right to petition gives rise to only a
conditional defamation privilege, which is lost upon a showing of actual malice. Id. at 863.
31 1. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers. AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548.567
(1973).
312. 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
313. 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-270 (1976).
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Capitol Hill lobbyists. Although these restrictions impose only slight burdens
on the right to petition, they demonstrate that the right is not absolute.
Furthermore, when one considers the actual malice and fault limitations,
the absence of an absolute defamation privilege clearly does not impose a
substantial burden on the right of petition. As the Supreme Court noted in
Gertz, "Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances
society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on public
issues." 3 14 Little value is served in protecting the right to knowingly or reck-
lessly give false information to the government. The Court's statement that
"there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact" 315 seems un-
equivocal. Only statements made with knowledge or serious doubts about
their falsity can be subjected to liability for defamation when the grievance
concerns a public official or public figure.31 6 Unless the Court recognizes a
constitutional right to give false information to the government, no first
amendment freedom will be inhibited by application of the actual malice
limitation to the petitioning privilege. Since the Supreme Court has found the
fault privilege to be the appropriate standard for discussion of private
persons,3 t7 the petitioning privilege should not offer additional protection
when private persons are discussed. The malice alleged in Noerr was based
on the defendants' anticompetive intent to harm their competitors.3 8 That
malice consisted of ill will, not actual malice. A partial explanation for courts'
confusion over Noerr-Pennington's scope is their failure to distinguish be-
tween the two types of malice. Common-law malice, such as anticompetitive
intent, is protected by Noerr-Pennington; actual malice, however, should not
be afforded like immunity. Any petitioning that would otherwise be violative
of the antitrust laws is necessarily malicious to competitors. This type of
malice must be protected if the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is to have any
meaning. The Supreme Court explained that it cannot make a difference that a
grievance is motivated by self-interest-a contrary holding would "deprive
the people of their right to petition in the very instances in which that right
may be of the most importance to them.- 319 Protecting malice of ill will, and
refusing to protect actual malice, however, is not contradictory. In Garrison
v. Louisiana the Court, without extending any privilege whatsoever to
statements made with actual malice, held that statements made out of hatred,
when honestly believed, are privileged. 320
The policy that prevented the Court from extending an absolute protec-
tion to the press-that "absolute protection ... requires a total sacrifice of
the competing value served by the law of defamation" 3 21 -is equally applic-
314. 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
315. Id.
316. St. Amant v. Thompson. 390 U.S. 727. 731 (1968).
317. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
318. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight. Inc.. 365 U.S. 127. 129 (1961).
319. Id. at 138.
320. 379 U.S. 64. 73 (1964).
321. Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc.. 418 U.S. 323. 341 (1974).
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able to persons exercising their right to petition. The major rationale for the
Supreme Court's refusal to extend the New York Times protection to discus-
sion of all potential plaintiffs is based on the premise that public officials and
public figures voluntarily seek publicity and have a greater opportunity to
correct any defamatory falsehoods through access to the media.3"- These
considerations also militate toward limiting the actual malice petitioning
privilege to defamation suits brought by public officials or public figures. The
first amendment defamation privileges should protect all persons to the same
extent, regardless of the type of first amendment activity concerned. Given
the Supreme Court's position on the unitary nature of the first amendment,3
an interpretation of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine that allows all persons
petitioning the government to assert the defamation privileges would heal the
apparent split between the New York Times line of cases324 and those cases
that have extended Noerr-Pennington beyond the bounds of antitrust law.
32
A conditional privilege would effectively protect, without unreasonably in-
hibiting, the right to petition.
An actual malice privilege for grievances concerning public plaintiffs is
completely sound. When actual malice is present, the policy behind extending
protection to defamatory falsehoods is gone. As the Supreme Court noted in
Gertz, defamatory falsehoods have no constitutional value in and of them-
selves, although in some cases defamatory speech is protected "in order to
protect speech that matters. 3 26 The rationale for extending constitutional
protection to defamatory speech is to ensure that persons may speak freely
without fear of a defamation suit arising from an inadvertent error or honest
misstatement of fact.327 The Webb court, however, would likely be troubled
by a negligence standard in petitioning cases concerning private persons. This
Comment's proposed standard, however, would not create as many problems
as might initially appear. The actual malice privilege would remain in effect for
all complaints about government officials, certainly a large percentage of the
grievances for which redress is sought. Of course, the actual malice privilege
would also attach to complaints about public figures.
The Supreme Court has already weighed the competing interests repre-
sented by the first amendment and defamation law.328 A private person has no
less interest in his reputation when a letter concerning him is sent to a
government official than when the same complaint appears in a newspaper or
on television. Gertz' rejection of Rosenbloom clarified that first amendment
values are not dependent on speech being categorized as a matter of public
322. Id. at 344-45.
323. See supra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 47-166 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 243-51 and accompanying text.
326. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.. 418 U.S. 323. 341 (1974).
327. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 47-78 and accompanying text.
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concern.329 In Gertz the Supreme Court clarified that when speaking about
private persons, the speaker cannot mindlessly spout verbiage, but instead
must carefully consider his words before speaking. Nevertheless, a speaker is
privileged if he innocently defames a private person.330
Further, under Gertz negligence is only the minimum protection to which
discussion of private persons is entitled. States are free to impose higher
standards of care regarding defamation actions concerning private figures. 33'
Additionally, the same activity protected by the first amendment right to
petition is often simultaneously protected by common-law defamation priv-
ileges. 332 If neither the state standard of "fault" nor common-law privileges
sufficiently protect petitioning activity, state courts are free to institute new
common-law or state constitutional privileges.333 Federal constitutional juris-
prudence need not create an exception to the well-established principle of a
unitary first amendment.
Another of the Webb court's concerns in instituting an absolute petition-
ing privilege was that a speaker's fear of a potential costly defamation law-
suit-even one that could be won on the merits-would inhibit the exercise of
his right to petition.334 After being advised by an attorney, most defamed"
plaintiffs, however, are unlikely to institute a losing lawsuit. Although in some
cases spurious lawsuits may force "constitutionally innocent" defendants
into costly litigation, that potential problem runs throughout American juris-
prudence. aa
The Webb dissent argued for a series of procedural protections instead of
an adoption of an absolute privilege.336 This position may prove to be more
sound than that advocated by the majority. Although the Supreme Court is
337reluctant to incorporate procedural rules into the Constitution, states are
free to create rules governing the procedure of their courts.
At least one commentator has recommended expanded use of the sum-
mary judgment procedure.338 Summary judgment may be an efficient means of
disposing of spurious lawsuits, especially in cases that concern the New York
Times privilege, which requires convincingly clear evidence of actual malice.
329. 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974). But see Note, Protecting the First Amendment Right to Petition: Inmunity
for Defendants in Defamnation Actions Thro/gh Application of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 31 AM. U.L.
REV. 147, 169 (1981) (notes that the government-not the public at large-is the audience, thus that the risk of
reputational harm is less).
330. 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
331. See cases cited supra note 154.
332. See Note, Protecting the First Amendment Right to Petition: hnnunityforDefendants ii Defamation
Actions Through Application of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 31 AM. U.L. REV. 147. 154-61 (1981).
333. See Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28,43 (W. Va. 1981) (the absolute defamation privilege is based on the
right to petition guaranteed by both the West Virginia and federal constitutions).
334. Id.
335. See supra note 137.
336. 282 S.E.2d 28, 46-47 (W. Va. 1981) (Neely, J., dissenting).
337. See Herbert v. Lando. 441 U.S. 153, 174 n.23 (1979).
338. See Note. The Constitutional Law of Defaniation-Recent Developments and Suggested State Court
Responses. 33 ME. L. REV. 371 (1981).
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Judges should ask not only whether the plaintiff can prove actual malice, but
whether the plaintiff can prove actual malice with convincing clarity.339 The
potential procedural protections coupled with the New York Times and Gertz
privileges will ensure the opportunity for free and robust exercise of the right
to petition.
CONCLUSION
The constitutional law of defamation represents the Supreme Court's
attempt to balance the competing interests represented by state defamation
law and the first amendment. Some courts and commentators, however, have
interpreted the New York Times and Gertz privileges narrowly, limiting them
to protection of the press and broadcast media. Nevertheless, the rationale
and policy underlying the constitutional privileges are appropriate not only in
the context of media defamation, but in the context of all first amendment
activity.
The rationale behind the constitutional defamation privileges is based on
the premise that the fear of a potential defamation lawsuit will inhibit first
amendment activity. The rationale is applicable to all forms of speech. A
unitary standard of first amendment protection will ensure that all first
amendment activity is equally protected from potential defamation liability.
In addition to the soundness of the unitary standard is the desirable
results its application will engender: across-the-board application of the New
York Times and Gertz privileges is consistent with the Court's belief that the
freedoms of speech, press, religion, and the right to petition work together to
ensure a broadly based right to free expression. Any other standard of protec-
tion will necessarily require a case-by-case analysis of the constitutional merit
of all speech giving rise to potential liability. Under a unitary standard, how-
ever, the constitutional defamation privileges protect equally the television
anchorman, the opinionated minister, the gregarious bartender, and the con-
cerned citizen writing his congressman.
Jeffrey A. Plunkett
339. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254, 28546 (1964). See also supra note 137.
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